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RECENT  TRENDS  in financial  markets  have stirred  fears  about  the ability 
of thrift institutions  in the United States-savings and loan associations 
and mutual  savings  banks-to  survive  and prosper.  Although  these insti- 
tutions  constituted  the  fastest  growing  segment  of the  financial  system  from 
1947  to the mid-1960s,  their  spectacular  prosperity  has dimmed  since  then 
as markets  have become  increasingly  volatile.  More and more they have 
experienced  deposit  drains,  and  no relief  seems  in sight.  Accordingly,  many 
knowledgeable  observers  question  the  prospects  of these  institutions  as now 
constituted  and regulated. 
Virtually  every  plan  for general  reform  of the financial  system  implicitly 
or explicitly  assumes  some  alteration  in the powers  of the thrift  institutions 
if they  are  not to suffer  serious  deterioration.  This  assumption  pervades  the 
analysis  and recommendations  of the Hunt Commission: 
Note: Andrew  Carron,  Eric Pookrum,  and Melba Wood assisted  with the computa- 
tions in this paper.  Helpful  comments  were  contributed  on an earlier  version  at a seminar 
at the University  of Oregon. 
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Thus,  even  if monetary  policy  is used  more  moderately,  the problems  of liquid- 
ity and solvency  encountered  by financial  institutions  could be as severe  as those 
experienced  during  1966,  1969  and 1970.  Modifications  in the structure  and  regu- 
lation of the financial  system  are urgently  needed....  Without  changes  in their 
operations,  there  is serious  question  about  the ability  of deposit  thrift  institutions 
to survive.1 
A  similar concern was voiced by Irwin Friend in his  "Summary and 
Recommendations" in the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's Study of the 
Savings and Loan Industry: 
For the savings  and loan industry,  a prolonged  period  of inflationary  pressure 
contained  mainly  by monetary  policy  and  rising  interest  rates  could  be disastrous.2 
Even more recently, the Secretary of  the Treasury stated a heightened 
concern: 
I would  reemphasize  that  today  we are  facedwith  economic  and  monetary  con- 
ditions that again raise serious questions about the viability of our financial 
institutions.3 
In the summer of 1973 and again in the summer of 1974 trends in market 
interest rates gave rise to great concern over the survival of these institu- 
tions. High interest rates on Treasury securities and the introduction of 
variable rate notes by bank holding companies punctuated an already bleak 
outlook for the thrift institutions. Deposits flowed out of mutual savings 
banks at a rapid pace and savings and loan associations had months of net 
withdrawals-a  rarity for the industry. Never happy with any competition, 
thrift institutions were especially vehement in opposing high-yielding Trea- 
sury securities and variable rate notes, which they felt might generate pres- 
sure that their industry could not withstand. 
The survival of an industry that holds over 35 percent of deposit liabil- 
ities and makes over 65 percent of residential  mortgage loans is a vital issue 
for public policy. Even if all depositors could be fully protected by federal 
deposit insurance, and mortgage financing were made available through 
other channels, the functioning of the financial system and the mortgage 
market would be  severely disrupted by  widespread failures among the 
thrift institutions. This paper examines the viability of these institutions 
and in particular focuses on their susceptibility to rapid and massive out- 
1. The Report of the President's  Commission  on Financial  Structure & Regulation 
(U.S. Government  Printing  Office,  1972),  pp. 15, 37. 
2. Vol. 1 (U.S. Government  Printing  Office,  1969),  pp. 7-8. 
3. "Statement  of William  E. Simon," in Financial  Institutions  Act-1973,  Hearings 
before  the Subcommittee  on Financial  Institutions  of the Senate  Committee  on Banking, 
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flows of interest-sensitive  deposits-sometimes  called  "hot money."  It ex- 
plores the interest  elasticities  of deposits  at thrift institutions  and their 
changes  over  time,  examining  the  implications  of various  simulated  changes 
in interest  rates,  and  as a special  case, simulating  the impact  of the variable 
rate  notes offered  by bank  holding  companies.  Finally,  the paper  attempts 
to determine  whether  the responsiveness  of depositors  is too great  to allow 
thrift  institutions  as now constituted  to survive  and prosper. 
Viability  and  Recent  Trends 
The viability  of institutions  can be defined  in two basic ways: (a) the 
ability  to stay  in business-that is, to avoid  bankruptcy,  and  (b) the ability 
to function  in a customary  manner.  The first  definition  is much easier  to 
quantify  than  the second,  because  it is difficult  to define  "customary."  For 
instance,  if the thrift  institutions  were  forced  to refrain  from making  new 
loans  and  called  as many  existing  loans  as possible,  they  might  survive,  but 
they  would  cease  (temporarily)  to be the supporters  of the  mortgage  market 
they were intended  to be. But if they simply  curtailed  their lending,  the 
threat  to their  viability  would  be a matter  of degree.  This paper  uses  both 
definitions,  although  the first is stressed  in the opening  sections  for two 
reasons.  First,  the failure  of a financial  institution  is more  serious  than  the 
slackening  of its activities.  Second,  while  government  credit  programs  are 
not necessarily  a sound  approach  for the long run,  they  can keep  the mort- 
gage  market  functioning.  The concluding  section  addresses  the question  of 
viability  in its sense  of customary  functioning. 
There  are at least two reasons  for questioning  the viability  of the thrift 
institutions,  one long term  and the other  more immediate.  Over  the long 
run, some fear, the payments  system  will evolve in such a way as to put 
deposit  intermediaries  that cannot offer  third-party  payment  accounts  at 
an insurmountable  disadvantage.4  The assumption  here is that electronic 
funds-transfer  systems  will come  to dominate  paper-oriented  systems,  and 
that, given the convenience  of dealing  with a single institution  in such a 
world,  few depositors  would  place time deposits  that did not offer  third- 
party  payment. 
4. Third-party  payment accounts are those that permit the depositor to direct the 
institution  to pay a third  party  by means  of an order  issued  to the third  party.  Checking 
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Of  more  immediate  importance  is the inherent  problem  thrift  institutions 
face in attracting  and holding  funds  during  periods  of rising  interest  rates 
because  of their  enforced  practices  of borrowing  short and lending  long. 
Such  practices  are  normally  safe at roughly  stable  interest  rates  since  rela- 
tively  few depositors  demand  payment  on a given day. But when  market 
rates,  particularly  short  rates,  rise  sharply,  these  institutions  come on diffi- 
cult times. Federal regulations  usually limit the speed and amount of 
deposit rate increases,  but thrift institutions  would be constrained  even 
without  these  ceilings  because  their  earnings  do not rise  quickly.  Forced  to 
hold a high  percentage  of their  assets  in fixed-yield,  long-term  instruments, 
they  can improve  yields  only on new  loans, but must  raise  deposit  rates  to 
attract  new funds and to hold many existing  deposits.5  They could pay 
higher  earnings  by drawing  on reserves,  hoping  to replenish  them  in periods 
of lower rates.  Institutions  have, however,  used this technique  very  little, 
inhibited  either  by their  own  reluctance  or by their  regulators-fortunately, 
as it turns  out, because  the rising  trend  in market  rates  since 1952  implies 
that they would  have  been unable  fully  to replenish  reserves. 
These constraints  have been the facts of life for the thrift institutions 
since  their  inception.  Those  who  now  fear  for their  viability  cite two impor- 
tant  recent  changes.  First,  interest  rate  fluctuations  are  becoming  more  and 
more  pronounced  and perhaps  more  frequent.  Second,  depositors  are get- 
ting smarter,  so that an increasing  amount  of funds at depository  institu- 
tions-so-called "hot money"-is  becoming  responsive  to small changes 
in the difference  between  market  rates  and deposit  rates.6  I believe  that so 
5. Since 1968 a  sizable proportion of  thrift deposits has been in fixed-maturity 
certificates,  which are subject  to stiff withdrawal  penalties  under  regulations  established 
in July 1973. But holders of passbook deposits, which in 1972 were 47 percent of all 
deposits  at savings  and loan associations  and 75 percent  at mutual  savings  banks, were 
free to move their funds without penalty; and before 1973 so were many certificate 
holders  because  withdrawal  penalties  were  weakly enforced  by institutions.  In addition, 
if market rates climb sufficiently  beyond the rates on their holdings, some certificate 
holders  might be willing to pay the penalty  to lock in a higher  yield elsewhere. 
6. "Hot money"  should  be distinguished  from illicit funds  and funds  that are  sensitive 
to international  rather  than domestic  interest  rate differentials.  The origin  of the term is 
obscure, although the usage is natural. Dhrymes and Taubman used it in their 1969 
study of the savings  and loan industry  for funds that fled eastern  for California  associa- 
tions; see Phoebus J. Dhrymes and Paul J. Taubman,  "An Empirical  Analysis of the 
Savings and Loan Industry,"  in Friend (ed.), Study of the Savings  and Loan Industry, 
Vol. 1, p. 99. As is pointed out below, before 1966, Treasury  bill rates  were well below 
deposit  rates  at savings  and loan associations,  so that they were  not as great  an attraction 
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far this characterization  is largely  impressionistic.  It seems  to be based  on 
three  facts:  (a) a large  volume  of deposits  is in fixed-term  accounts  paying 
rates above those on passbook  savings;  (b) in the mid-1960s  California 
savings  and  loan associations  were  apparently  able  to draw  in considerable 
sums  by offering  higher  interest  rates  than  were  paid  elsewhere;  and  (c) in 
recent  years  thrift  institutions  have experienced  deposit  inflows  in inverse 
relation  to market  rates.  Whether  this pattern  represents  a departure  from 
the past, and how hot this money  really  is, remains  unclear. 
But the hot-money  argument  says that for any given rise in market 
interest  rates  more funds will tend to leave thrift institutions,  that sharp 
increases  in market  rates  will become  increasingly  frequent,  and that the 
resulting  flows  will be so large  as to bankrupt  many  thrift  institutions. 
INTEREST  RATE  AND  DEPOSIT  TRENDS 
While,  as Figure  1 indicates,  deposits  at thrift  institutions  have  increased 
sharply  since 1952,  in recent  years  the growth  has been especially  strong 
in forms  other  than  regular  passbook  saving.  In the second  quarter  of 1974, 
savings  and loan associations  held $126 billion of deposits  (certificates) 
earning  more  than  the  regular  passbook  rate,  up from  $14  billion  in the first 
quarter  of 1967.  Over  the same  period  deposits  earning  the regular  rate  or 
less rose from $96 billion to $105 billion.7  Certificates  at mutual  savings 
banks  rose  from $11  billion  in the first  quarter  of 1967  to $42  billion  in the 
second  quarter  of 1974,  while  regular  deposits  expanded  from $46 billion 
to $57 billion. It is dangerous  to conclude,  however,  that these certifi- 
cates all constitute  a new breed of hot money. Almost certainly  factors 
other than interest  elasticities  contributed  to this growth.  Undoubtedly, 
some  of the funds  would  have  been  put in passbook  accounts  if certificates 
had not been available,  and this portion  might  not, then,  be subject  to any 
extra interest  sensitivity.  Actually,  the variability  of thrift institution  de- 
posits  does not seem  to have  been rising  before 1968:  the quarterly  coeffi- 
cient  of variation  for savings  and  loan deposits  declined  from  0.109  for the 
period 1952:1 through 1960:4 to 0.045 for the period 1961:1 through 
1968:2. 
Interest  rates  have  been  on a clear  upward  path  since  World  War  II. The 
three-month  Treasury  bill rate averaged  less than 2 percent  in 1952  and 
7. In between  they also declined  in August 1970, while certificates  enjoyed  uninter- 
rupted  growth  after August 1968. U2  *  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~U 
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over  7 percent  in 1973.  This trend  by itself  has been unfavorable  to thrift 
institutions,  since their assets  have longer  maturities  than their  liabilities. 
In addition,  the variability  of interest  rates  has increased.  Since  the Federal 
Reserve  ceased  to support  Treasury  securities  in 1951,  the  monthly  variance 
of the bill rate  rose  from  0.703  for the years  1952-65  to 1.547  for the years 
1966-73. 
The yields on the portfolios  of thrift institutions  have adjusted  much 
more slowly than short-term  market  rates, and accordingly  deposit  rates 
have not fully kept pace with market  rates, as Figure 2 reveals.  It also 
shows  that  deposit  rates  have  adjusted  somewhat  more  promptly  than  asset 
yields  to movements  in short  rates. 
On a seasonally  adjusted  quarterly  basis, total deposits  at thrift  institu- 
tions (including  interest  and dividends  credited during the quarter),  as 
measured  in the flow-of-funds  accounts,  have virtually  always  risen  since 
1952.  In several  quarters  deposits  were  virtually  flat.  But  the average  annual 
rate  of growth  from 1952  to 1973  was 13.2  percent  and 7.5 percent  for the 
two sets of institutions,  respectively. 
In examining  viability,  it is instructive  to take  deposits  net of current  in- 
terest  and  dividend  payments,  which  are  book  transfers  and  do not provide 
funds for new lending.  Without  these payments,  both savings  and loan 
associations  and  mutual  savings  banks  had  net outflows  of funds  in 1966:2, 
1973:3,  and the last three  quarters  of 1969.  In addition,  savings  and loan 
associations  lost funds  in 1966:3,  and  the mutual  savings  banks  in 1970:  1. 
All these losses are, however,  modest  compared  with total deposits.  The 
largest  decline  in any quarter  was less than $2 billion  for savings  and  loan 
associations  and less than $1 billion for mutual  savings  banks, or about 
1 percent  of 1973  assets  in both cases. 
The  Demand  for Deposits 
Central  to the viability  of thrift  institutions  is the responsiveness  of their 
depositors  to the costs and returns  of holding  their  liabilities,  particularly 
in relation  to alternative  forms  of wealth.  Several  studies  (cited  below)  of 
deposits  at savings  and  loan associations  in the  late 1960s  attempted  to esti- 
mate this responsiveness  by establishing  demand  functions  for thrift de- 
posits. But so many changes  took place in the structure  of the industry 
(ceilings  on deposit  interest  rates  and  the spread  of certificates  are  perhaps r-L  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~- 
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the most important)  after 1965  that estimates  based largely  on pre-1966 
experience  naturally  come into question.  Fortunately,  enough  experience 
has accumulated  since  these  studies  to provide  a basis  for more  confident 
estimates  of elasticities. 
The demand  for thrift institution  deposits depends  on the allocation 
savers  make  of their  overall  wealth.8  The  amount  of funds  a depositor  puts 
to each use should depend  positively  on the rate of monetary  return  it 
offers  as well as on its nonpecuniary  advantages,  such as liquidity,  safety, 
convenience,  and inversely  on the corresponding  characteristics  of other 
uses available  to him. Further,  the fraction  of wealth  that an individual 
holds  in a particular  form  at a given  set of interest  rates  may  vary  with  his 
income,  although  how  this  relationship  runs  is not entirely  clear.  For lower- 
middle-income  people,  who hold the bulk of their  wealth  in durable  goods 
such as houses  and automobiles,  increases  in income  are  likely  to be asso- 
ciated  with increases  in the share  of wealth  held in thrift  deposits.  On the 
other hand, wealthier  individuals  probably  allocate the bulk of income 
increases  to money market  instruments,  bonds, equities,  and other non- 
deposit  forms of wealth.  The overall  impact of increases  in income and 
deposit  shares  is therefore  an empirical  question  and depends  on wealth 
positions of potential  depositors.  Intuitively,  the deposit-augmenting  re- 
sponse  seems  likely  to predominate  among  thrift  depositors,  but this is a 
question  for the data  to decide. 
8. This analysis bears some similarities  to Franco Modigliani, "The Dynamics of 
Portfolio Adjustment  and the Flow of Savings Through  Financial Intermediaries,"  in 
Edward M. Gramlich  and Dwight M. Jaffee  (eds.), Savings  Deposits, Mortgages,  anld 
Housing:  Studies  for the Federal  Reserve-MIT-Penn  Economic  Model (Heath 1972). 
Modigliani's  precise  form was not used for several  reasons,  however.  First, he estimated 
one equation  for all thrift institutions  and another  to explain  the share of savings  and 
loan deposits in the total, obtaining deposits at mutual savings banks as a residual. I 
have estimated functions for each directly. Second, Modigliani picked 1962:2 as a 
quarter  for a structural  shift  in demand,  while  I take 1965:4  (in fact, Modigliani  suspends 
his trend  variable  at this quarter).  Third,  his formulation  does not incorporate  a delayed 
reaction  of perceived  to actual  rates  in his total equation  and in general  handles  shifts in 
interest  rate responses  differently. 
For other studies of the determination  of thrift deposits, see Edward M. Gramlich 
and David T. Hulett, "The Demand for and Supply of Savings Deposits," in ibid.; 
Stephen  M. Goldfeld, "Savings  and Loan Associations  and the Market  for Savings:  As- 
pects of Allocational  Efficiency,"  in Friend  (ed.), Study  of the Savings  and  Loan  Industry, 
Vol. 2; William  L. Silber,  Portfolio  Behavior  of Financial  Institutions  (Holt, Rinehart  and 
Winston, 1970); George K. Kardouche,  The Conmpetition  for Savings:  Determinants  of 
Deposits  at Commercial  Banks,  Mutual  Savings  Banks,  and  Savings  and  Loan  Associations 
(The Conference  Board, 1969);  and Dhrymes  and Taubman,  "Empirical  Analysis." 602  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1974 
Demand  for  thrift  deposits  therefore  is estimated  according  to the  follow- 
ing form: 
(1)  S*  =  f  (iP,  iC  iM3  W)  ' 
where 
Sj = the ratio of deposit  type  j to wealth;  the asterisk  denotes  the de- 
sired  value 
ijP 
=  the rate  paid on deposit  j (own rate)  as perceived  by depositors 
iP  =  a vector  of perceived  rates  paid on competing  deposit  forms 
iP =  a vector of perceived  rates paid on market  instruments  such as 
Treasury  bills and corporate  bonds 
y 
W =  the ratio of income to household net worth. 
Equation  (1) employs  perceived  interest  yields rather  than actual yields 
because  the former  may  not adjust  immediately  to changes  in the  latter  and 
it is the  former  that  govern  behavior.  The  nonrate  characteristics  of various 
forms of wealth such as liquidity  and safety are assumed  constant  over 
time.9 
Equation  (1) describes  equilibrium  levels  of deposit  holdings  relative  to 
wealth,  but actual stocks may not instantly  adjust  to desired  values,  for 
several  reasons  apart  from the delay in adapting  perceived  interest  rates 
to changes  in actual  rates.  (The  latter  delays  are  incorporated  directly  into 
the equation  by the approximations  of perceived  interest  rates.)  The first 
lies  in the  transactions  costs  of reallocating  wealth  among  forms-the mon- 
etary  costs,  such  as commissions  and  penalties  for  early  withdrawal,  and  the 
nonmonetary  cost  in nuisance.  These  costs  are  likely  to be higher,  the  larger 
and  the more  rapid  is the adjustment.  Second,  individuals  prefer  to spread 
9. By and large, these characteristics  have varied  little if at all. The most important 
exception  is the liquidity  of certificate  accounts, because  penalties  for early withdrawal 
were stiffened  in July 1973. The practice  of giving gifts to spur new deposits and new 
accounts  complicates  the measurement  of the perceived  own rate because  they may add 
to the actual  return  on deposits.  The prevalence  of this practice  has varied  geographically 
and over  time, in some cases as a result  of regulation  and legislation.  The costs of these 
gifts appear  in advertising  expenditures,  but this figure  includes many other expenses. 
The values  to depositors  depend  further  upon the usefulness  of the gifts to them-the 
reason  that gift competition  is not fully efficient.  I assume that the error  in measuring 
deposit  rates  arising  from omitting  the values of gifts is negligible. William  E. Gibson  603 
some  adjustments  over  time.  For instance,  at sufficiently  high income  elas- 
ticities  of demand  for deposits,  an  increase  in income  could  require  a decline 
in consumption  if stock equilibrium  were  to be regained  within  a quarter 
or two. Accordingly,  short-run  desired  levels probably  do not adjust  in- 
stantaneously  to the  long-run  desired  levels  given  by equation  (1). This  type 
of delayed  adjustment  can be accommodated  by postulating  the following 
response  to discrepancies  between  desired  and actual  deposit  shares: 
(2)  Sit  -  Sj-  =  y(Sj*  -  Sjt-), 
or 
(3)  Si =  iJ,  i,  i3W+  (1 -  7)Sjtl1 
where  t denotes  time. 
Two  more  special  features  of the adjustment  should  be incorporated  into 
the model.  First, in the past two decades,  up to 1973,  the appreciation  of 
assets, particularly  common stocks, accounted  for a large share-about 
two-thirds-of the increase  in household  net worth. Such increases  in 
wealth are unlikely  to be reallocated  among other components  in port- 
folios as quickly  as increases  in other  forms,  for several  reasons:  (1) selling 
these assets  involves  commission  costs; (2) a prompt  sale of large blocks 
of equities  could depress  the price  in the short  run, particularly  for thinly 
traded  issues,  which  constitute  an important  portion  of net worth;  and  (3) 
probably  most  important,  realizing  the capital  gain  on an asset  subjects  the 
holder  to capital  gains  tax. For all these  reasons,  then, the adjustment  of 
actual  to desired  shares  is likely  to be slower  when  appreciation  of equities 
accounts  for a larger  fraction  of the increase  in wealth. 
At the other  extreme,  fresh  additions  to wealth  in the form  of saving  are 
subject  to far fewer  of these  transactions  costs-in  particular,  they are  free 
from capital  gains  taxation.  They  could be allocated  among  assets  on the 
basis of current  preferences  as characterized  by equation  (1), independent 
of any lag in the adjustment  of desired  to past actual  deposit  shares.  One 
might therefore  expect  that these flows would not involve  the lags asso- 
ciated  with  rebalancing  the assets  in a portfolio. 
On the other  hand,  a saver  might  well  have  regard  for the lagged  adjust- 
ment  of the  rest  of his  portfolio  in allocating  fresh  saving.  Individuals  whose 
wealth  has been  increased  by the appreciation  of some  assets  can adjust  by 
allocating  a greater  than  average  portion  of wealth  additions  to other  forms, 604  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1974 
such as deposits,  instead  of realizing  capital  gains or redistributing  other 
types of holdings.  In either  case, the volume  of thrift deposits  should  be 
positively  related  to personal  saving. The issue is whether  fresh saving 
above  the equilibrium  share  will be allocated  to these  deposits  in order  to 
offset  slow adjustment  to capital  gains. 
Since  the value of household  wealth  in the economy  changes  only as a 
result  of capital  gains (or losses) and personal  saving  (or dissaving),  the 
effect  of the composition  of changes  in wealth  on deposit  shares  can be 
approximated  by including  capital gains. Ideally,  this impact on adjust- 
ment  should  be accounted  for by making  y a function  of the  ratio  of capital 
gains  to wealth.  To keep  the function  manageable,  however,  it is added  as 
a separate  variable: 
(4)  sit =  V (it  i",  iP,-W)  +  C  -  )sjt-l  +  g W ' 
where  CG  is capital  gains  of households  (defined  as the  change  in household 
net worth  less  personal  saving  in the current  quarter).  The  discussion  above 
implies  that  g should  be less than or equal  to zero.  It will be less than  zero 
if the lag effects  of capital  gains are not fully offset  by the allocation  of 
personal  saving  and zero if they are. 
THE  SUPPLY  OF  DEPOSITS 
A complete  model  of thrift  deposit  determination  would  also  include  one 
or more  equations  specifying  the supply  relationships.  Presumably  the vol- 
ume  of deposits  and  the yields  paid  on them  are  simultaneously  determined 
by the public's  willingness  to hold deposits  and  the institutions'  willingness 
to supply  them. Supply  preference  in turn should depend on yields on 
assets  that institutions  might  acquire  with  the deposited  funds,  along  with 
reserves  and other  opportunities  for borrowing. 
Separate  supply  functions  were not used here for two related  reasons. 
First,  the thrift  institutions  generally  do not directly  control  the quantities 
of deposits  they supply.  Rather,  they set rates  and stand  ready  to take all 
the  deposits  offered.10  Their  ability  to set  rates  has  been  exogenously  limited 
10. Something  of an exception  appeared  in 1973  when savings  and loan associations 
were  allowed  to issue four-year  certificates  of deposit  with no rate  ceiling in volumes  up 
to 5 percent  of savings  capital. Once the limit was reached,  an institution  could accept 
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by regulation  or legislation,  particularly  since 1966.  To a considerable  ex- 
tent,  then,  demand  does not determine  deposit  rates.  Second,  the omission 
of a supply  function  seems  to make little difference  to the estimates.  Al- 
though Dhrymes  and Taubman  stressed  the need to incorporate  supply 
influences  in their  study,  the results  of doing  so did  not appear  far different 
from  their  single-equation  estimates.' 
Estimated  Functions 
As Figure 2 shows, the relationship  between  the rates on deposits  in 
thrift  institutions  and on Treasury  bills changed  in 1966.  Before  that year 
yields  on Treasury  bills  generally  remained  below  those  on savings  deposits, 
but after that the relationship  was often reversed.  After 1965,  therefore, 
bills (and other open  market  instruments)  probably  became  much closer 
substitutes  for thrift deposits.  A variety  of demand  functions  estimated 
over  both periods  show  substantial  changes  in elasticities  around  1966,  and 
I have therefore  estimated  the demand  functions  for the period 1966:  1- 
1974:2.  In the estimations,  the own  yield  is an average  of the rates  paid on 
deposits  at the two types of institutions,  weighted  by volumes  (iSL  and 
ISB).12  The yield  on competing  deposits  in commercial  banks  is denoted  as 
ic and is approximated  by the rate on commercial  bank certificates.  The 
yield on market  alternatives  was approximated  by the market  yield on 
11. "Empirical  Analysis." 
12. The own-rate  series  are not perfect  measures  of the incentives  for depositors  be- 
cause they combine  changes  in the level of rates with changes  in the distribution  of de- 
posits-that  is, since  the series  is an average  weighted  by volumes,  it can rise because  the 
overall  structure  of rates  rises  or because  depositors  shift  their  preferences  toward  higher- 
yielding deposits. To some extent these shifts should be included  in the rate, most im- 
portantly  when passbook  holders  realize  that they can obtain a higher  return  with mini- 
mal loss in liquidity by moving to a short-term  certificate  account (as was particularly 
true before  July 1973). On the other hand, if depositors  came to expect a decline in in- 
terest  rates  and shifted  to longer-term  deposits,  the average  own rate would rise, but not 
owing to any incentive  of higher  rate structure  since the structure  was unchanged. 
In general,  the higher  the yield paid the more  restrictions  supervisory  agencies  require 
in the form of higher minimum denomination  or longer minimum term. They also 
attempt  to maintain  the structure  of incentives  when rate  ceilings  are modified.  Accord- 
ingly,  the primary  source  of error  in this series  results  from  changes  in tastes  for maturities 
or denominations,  possibly as a result of interest  rate expectations.  It is assumed  here 
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three-month  Treasury  bills  (ib),13  wealth  by net worth  of households  (W), 
and  income  by disposable  income  (YD). Capital  gains  (CG)  are  changes  in 
net worth  net of personal  saving.  Finally,  for estimation  purposes,  Sit- 
was subtracted  from  each side to make  the dependent  variable  the change 
in shares  (ASSL and  ASSB). Accordingly,  the coefficient  of the lagged  term 
should  lie between  -1  and 0. 
The  remaining  required  specification  is the process  by which  perceptions 
of interest  rates  are generated.  I assume  that depositors  and potential  de- 
positors are not immediately  aware of all changes  in their opportunity 
sets-that for instance,  it takes  time  to realize  that  Treasury  bill yields  have 
risen.  To account  for these  delays  (which  are  not necessarily  related  to the 
lags in adjusting  portfolios),  perceived  interest  rates  are approximated  by 
weighted  averages  of current  and  past  interest  rates.  Preliminary  Almon  lag 
techniques  in ordinary  least-squares  regressions  were  employed  to analyze 
the lag distributions  by which  perceived  interest  rates were  generated.  In 
13. Several other candidates  could have served as the proxy for yields on market 
alternatives.  The most important  are the commercial  paper  rate (often used in demand 
functions  for money, as in Stephen  M. Goldfeld, "The Demand for Money Revisited," 
Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  3:1973, pp. 577-638), and the corporate  bond 
rate (used by Modigliani  in equations on the demand  for thrift deposits).  The bill rate 
was preferred  here  for a number  of reasons.  First, and far from trivially,  I am not aware 
that the trade associations  for the thrift and home building  industries  have ever con- 
demned the issue of commercial  paper or corporate  bonds or cited them as threats  to 
their deposits. Second, commercial  paper is typically issued in lots of $100,000 or $1 
million. Although  lots of $25,000  are not unheard  of, even these are far in excess of the 
average  size of accounts at thrift institutions:  in 1973  the average  was $3,841 at savings 
and loan associations  and $3,406 at mutual savings  banks, according  to data from the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the National Association of  Mutual Savings 
Banks, respectively  (breakdowns  between passbook and certificate accounts are not 
available); the averages were $2,773 and $2,349, respectively,  in 1965. As averages, 
these figures  do not rule out large volumes of sizable accounts, but in general  it seems 
prudent  to make  the comparison  using  an instrument  with a smaller  minimum  denomina- 
tion, such as Treasury  bills. Some experiments  with the corporate  bond rate produced 
results  inferior  to those using the bill rate. Furthermore,  Treasury  bills are more similar 
to deposits than are these other instruments  with respect to liquidity, maturity, and 
government  guaranty.  They are available  at no commissions  at Federal  Reserve  Banks 
or at the Treasury  Department  in Washington,  and individuals  can be certain  of obtain- 
ing bills by submitting  noncompetitive  tenders.  Though the minimum  denomination  of 
bills was raised  from $1,000 to $10,000  in February  1970, they retained  their other ad- 
vantages.  The bill rate probably  also serves as a proxy for yields of other government 
securities-notes, certificates,  bonds, and agency issues-whose  minimum  denomination 
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these  estimations,  the own-rate  responses  of deposit  demands  at both types 
of institutions  were  concentrated  in the current  and  past  two quarters,  with 
roughly  equal weights.  Accordingly,  three-quarter  simple averages  (USL3 
and iSB3)  of current  and past own rates were used to capture  own-rate 
responses.  On the other  hand,  responses  to the bill rate were  spread  over 
the current  and past four quarters,  suggesting  that depositors  take several 
quarters  to perceive  these changes.  As suspected,  depositors'  perceptions 
rose more rapidly  at first  and then more gradually.  The bill rate variable 
was thus constructed  as a weighted  average  of the current  and past four 
quarters  with weights  of 1, 2, 3, 2, and 1, respectively,  and denoted  ib5. 
Finally,  the best relationship  between  thrift  deposits  and the commercial 
bank  rate  was estimated  using  only the current  quarter's  rate.'4 
Although  no interest  rate  response  is estimated  across  these institutions, 
the determination  of their  deposit  flows is very likely not independent- 
that is, many of the forces outside  the model that cause especially  large 
increases  in deposits  at savings  and loan associations  also cause them at 
mutual  savings  banks.  The  efficiency  of the estimation  of the demand  func- 
tions can be enhanced  by taking  this relationship  into account  using the 
seemingly-unrelated-regressions  technique.15 
Table 1 reports  the results  of the estimates  of equation  (4). The coeffi- 
cients  in the table  reveal  a strongly  positive  response  of both types of de- 
posits to changes  in the rates paid on them and negative  responses  to 
changes  in yields  on Treasury  bills and  commercial  bank  deposits.  In each 
equation  the response  to own  rate  is larger  than  that  to the yields  on either 
substitute.  In the mutual  savings  bank equation  the own-rate  coefficient 
exceeds  the sum of the coefficients  on substitutes  only slightly,  implying 
that  a relatively  small  proportion  of the new  funds  drawn  in by an increase 
14. With the rate variables  specified  in these forms, the rate at one type of institution 
has no significant  effect  on the deposits  of the other.  First, the two thrift  institution  rates 
move in parallel,  particularly  since 1966  when  they  became  subject  to regulatory  ceilings. 
The relative  attractiveness  of deposits  at the two types of institutions,  in terms  of rates, 
has therefore  been roughly  constant. Second, with a few exceptions, savings and loan 
associations  and mutual  savings banks tend to dominate  different  geographic  markets. 
Mutual  savings  banks are permitted  in only eighteen  states, primarily  in the Northeast, 
and where they operate  they tend to attract  larger  deposit shares than do savings and 
loan associations. 
15. See Arnold Zellner, "An Efficient Method of Estimating  Seemingly  Unrelated 
Regressions  and Tests  for Aggregation  Bias,"  Journal  of the  American  Statistical  Associa- 
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Table  1. Coefficients  and  Statistics  for Demand  Functions  for Deposits 
at Savings  and  Loan  Associations  and  Mutual  Savings  Banks, 
1966:1-1974:2 
Change  in ratio of deposits  to household 
net wortha 
Independent  variable  and  Savings  and loan  Mutual  savings 
summary  statistic  associations  banks 
Independent  variableb 
Constant  -0.01185  (-4.625)  -0.0026  (-2.121) 
Own rate 
Savings  and loan associations,  iSL3  0.00156  (4.980)  ...  ... 
Mutual savings  banks,  iSB3  ...  ...  0.0005  (3.996) 
Treasury  bill rate, 4b5  -0.00039  (-3.685)  -0.0002  (-4.519) 
Commercial  bank rate, ic  -0.00024  (-0.880)  -0.0002  (-2.289) 
Ratio of deposits  to household  net 
worth,  lagged one quarter 
Savings  and loan associations  -0.07665  (-2.185)  ...  ... 
Mutual savings  banks  ...  ...  -0.2072  (-2.790) 
Ratio of capital gains to household 
net worth, CG/W  -0.01831  (-4.233)  -0.0085  (-5.010) 
Ratio of disposable  income to 
household  net worth, YD/W  0.05301  (3.576)  0.0330  (5.643) 
Summary  statistic" 
R2  0.691  ...  0.723  ... 
Standard  error  0.00035  ...  0.00012  ... 
Durbin-Watson  2.202  ...  1.890  ... 
Sources: Derived from equation (4). See appendix at end of this paper for data sources. 
a.  The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
b. See the appendix for a detailed description of the variables. 
c.  Summary statistics are from the first stage of the regressions. 
in own rate comes from money and other assets whose yields are not 
accounted  for in this equation.  This is not the case for savings  and loan 
associations,  however,  whose own-rate  coefficient  exceeds  twice the sum 
of the other  two.'6  The rate on mutual  savings  bank  deposits  was tested  in 
this equation  but it never  yielded  a significant  coefficient  and even  its sign 
was not robust to minor changes  in the specification.  While deposits  at 
both savings  and  loan associations  and mutual  savings  banks  are sensitive 
16. This result does not appear  to be due simply to the fact that part of the growtlh 
of deposits comes from interest that depositors do not bother moving. The own-rate 
coefficient  for savings  and loan deposits remained  high even when the deposit variable 
was taken as deposits  less dividends  credited  in the current  quarter. William  E. Gibson  609 
to the bill rate, the latter are even more responsive  to commercial  bank 
rates.'7 
The coefficients  show that deposit  flows tend to be depressed  by a con- 
centration  of wealth  increases  in the form of capital  gains.  This influence 
is not offset  by allocations  of personal  saving,  a not surprising  result  since 
the  latter  are  typically  much  smaller  than  capital  gains.  Individuals  allocate 
increasing  shares  of their  assets  to thrift  deposits  as their  income  levels  rise, 
so that the behavior  of low- and middle-income  individuals  apparently 
offsets  any  tendency  of higher-income  groups  to concentrate  on other  forms 
of wealth when their incomes  increase.'8  Finally, the coefficients  of the 
lagged  deposit  stocks  have  the correct  signs  but imply  that  for savings  and 
loan associations  only 8 percent  of the gap between  desired  and actual 
deposits  is closed in the first quarter.  This result  is somewhat  surprising, 
particularly  because  the delayed  response  of perceived  to actual  interest 
rates  is separately  accounted  for. These  coefficients  remained  low through 
several  changes  in the specification,  including  the omission  of the capital 
gains  variable.  They  are,  however,  still  well  above  those  obtained  by Modig- 
17. Alternatively,  one might postulate  that no funds can come from other assets or 
from induced  saving  and that, in fact, all the coefficients  of the interest  rate variables  in 
equation (4) must sum to zero. Equation (4) was reestimated  with this restriction.  (It 
does not, however,  require  the coefficients  to sum to zero each quarter  but rather  is con- 
cerned with the overall impact of rates and the maximum  decrements  that changes in 
interest  rates  can produce.)  The estimates  (with t-statistics  in parentheses)  are: 
ASSLt  =  -0.0146  +  0.000633iSL3  -  0.000399ib5  -  0.0002344 
(-4.601)  (2.104)  (-2.922)  (-0.662) 
-  0.0218SSLtI  -  0.0148CG/W  +  0.0760YD/W; 
(-0.510)  (-2.734)  (4.349) 
ASsBt  =  -0.00352  +  0.000379iSB3  -  0.0167ib5  -  0.0218i4 
(-2.706)  (4.894)  (-4.001)  (-2.500) 
-  0.155SSBtI  -  0.00876CG/W  +  0.0338YD/W. 
(-1.996)  (-5.000)  (5.665) 
Comparing  these estimates  with Table 1 shows that the primary  impact on interest 
rate coefficients  is to reduce  those for the own rates, primarily  for savings  and loan de- 
posits. Those for the bill rate and the bank rate are almost entirely unaffected.  The 
speeds  of adjustment  of actual  to desired  deposit  stocks also decline  noticeably.  But be- 
cause the coefficients  of the bill and bank rates  are virtually  unchanged,  nearly  all of the 
simulations  below are  robust  to this restriction.  The only one that is sensitive  involves  an 
increase  in own rates  to arrest  deposit outflows,  and the power of this change would be 
correspondingly  reduced  under  the above assumptions. 
18. Modigliani  found a negative,  although  not always significant,  coefficient  for this 
variable  in his total thrift deposit equation. 610  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1974 
liani in his estimates  for total thrift  deposits  over an earlier  period.  The 
adjustment  of mutual  savings  bank  deposits  tends  to be much  more  rapid, 
over  20 percent  a quarter. 
Has Money  Become  "Hotter"? 
The essence of the issue about hot money is whether  interest  rate re- 
sponses  have  intensified  since 1966.  In that  year  the thrift  institutions  were 
pressed  by high  market  interest  rates,  and  suffered  net deposit  withdrawals 
for the first  time in the postwar  period.  Furthermore,  rates on Treasury 
bills matched  or exceeded  thrift  deposit  rates on a continuing  basis, and 
bills  thus offered  much  more  effective  competition  for funds. 
Along with other  observers,  Dhrymes  and Taubman  detected  a shift of 
elasticities  in 1966.  When  they extended  their  sample  to include  that year, 
for a regression  of the logarithm  of the ratio of savings  and loan deposits 
to normal  income,  the coefficient  of the logarithm  of the Treasury  bill rate 
went  from -0.0198 to -0.0331.19 But since  their  study  ended  with 1966, 
it could not fully investigate  the structural  shifts  in general  or changes  in 
elasticities  in particular.  Accordingly,  equation  (4) was estimated  for sav- 
ings and loan associations  and mutual  savings  banks  for 1953:2-1965:4, 
using  the seemingly-unrelated-regressions  technique. 
The estimates  of equation  (4) comparable  to those  in Table 1 for the ear- 
lier period  appear  in  the  first  two  columns  of  Table  2.  The  short-run  response 
of deposits  to the bill rate  was  far  lower  in the earlier  period  and,  unlike  the 
later  period,  is not significant.  In addition,  the commercial  bank rate has 
insignificant  coefficients,  which  is somewhat  surprising  since  it was above 
open market  rates in this period. Preliminary  regressions  using Almon 
lags suggested  that  part  of the problem  was  the dispersion  of the impact  of 
the bank rate over time. Accordingly,  several  weighted  averages  of past 
bank  rates  were  tried,  and best results  were  obtained  using  an average  of 
the current  and past five quarters,  with equal weights.  Estimations  using 
this  variable  (ic6) appear  in the  last  two columns  of Table  2 and  show  higher 
coefficients  for the bank  rate;  it was, however,  significant  only for savings 
and loan associations,  for which it is far higher  than in the later period. 
The  coefficient  of the bank  rate  is so much  higher  in the earlier  period  than 
19. "Empirical  Analysis,"  pp. 94-96. .11-116  . e  .11-11  11-11  11-11 
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the later  period  that the sum of coefficients  on substitutes  is higher  in the 
earlier  period. 
Comparison  of  long-run responses is  more problematic  because it 
requires  dividing  by the coefficients  of lagged  stocks,  none of which  differs 
from zero at a reasonable  level of significance.  These coefficients  are far 
smaller  than  in Table  1, so that  some  of the long-run  responses  estimated  in 
this  way  are  very  large.  Because  of questions  regarding  the true  sizes  of the 
coefficients  of lagged values, the long-run  responses  are not presented. 
For the short  run,  it appears  that  in a sense  savings  and  loan deposits  were 
no more  rate  responsive  in the  later  period  but  simply  changed  the direction 
of responses  as a result  of the change  in the structure  of rates on alter- 
natives.  It should  be remembered,  however,  that the lag structure  on the 
bank  rate  means  that the total response  took longer  in the earlier  period 
though  not for mutual  savings  banks.  The  own-rate  responses  were  roughly 
the same  in the earlier  period-in fact the coefficient  is modestly  higher  for 
the mutual  savings  bank rate.  In addition  to the lower  responses  to com- 
petitive  interest  rates,  the estimates  for the early  period  are also charac- 
terized  by extremely  slow adjustment  of actual to desired  deposits.  The 
adjustments  have been much more rapid  since 1965,  in line with the hy- 
pothesis  that savers  are  now more  responsive  to all kinds  of influences,  not 
interest  rates  alone. 
For both savings  and  loan associations  and  mutual  savings  banks,  then, 
it appears  that the sensitivity  of deposits  to open  market  interest  rates  has 
shifted  sharply  since 1965.  This  phenomenon  seems  to have  been  generated 
in part  by a general  increase  in savers'  responsiveness  and in part  by the 
change  in the  relationships  among  thrift  rates,  bank  rates,  and  open  market 
rates.  Unlike the earlier  period,  open market  rates  have tended  to exceed 
bank  rates  during  periods  of rising  rates  since 1965,  so that thrift  deposits 
have  become  less  responsive  to commercial  bank  rates  and  more  responsive 
to open  market  yields. 
Simulations  of Interest  Rate Increases 
To assess  the  implications  of the  interest  rate  sensitivity  of thrift  deposits, 
the demand  functions  in Table 1 were  simulated  for four shocks  from the 
yields on substitutes.  The simulations  add to actual experience  further 
increases  in yields,  calculated  to span  a range  of likely  interest  rate  behavior William  E. Gibson  613 
and  to approach  worst  possible  cases.  They  thus  constitute  a "double  dose" 
of sharply  rising  rates.  In each instance,  the increases  were  phased  in with 
equal increments  over three quarters  because  historically  this has been 
about the maximum  length of sharp  continuous  advances  in market  in- 
terest  rates.  All the simulations  begin with 1971:3,  because  interest  rates 
were  fairly  stable  then and the succeeding  quarters  were not marked  by 
credit  crunch,  and because  the results  then yield twelve quarters  of ex- 
perience  by which  to gauge  the adjustments.  All other  rates  were  held un- 
changed.  The numbers  are  obtained  by multiplying  actual  net worth  in the 
quarter  by the difference  between  the deposit  shares  predicted  by the equa- 
tion with and without  the shocks. 
Table  3 reports  the results  of lifting  the three-month  Treasury  bill rate 
above its historical  path by the largest  margin  by which  it ever  rose over 
three  quarters-3.46  percentage  points.  The  increase  is phased  in over  three 
quarters  by assuming  that  the shift  was 1.15  points  in the first  quarter,  2.31 
points  in the second,  and the full 3.46 points  in the third  and all quarters 
thereafter.  This  case  is referred  to hereafter  as the  maximum  increment  in the 
bill rate. 
Table 3.  Simulations  of Deposit Losses of Thrift Institutions 
Assuming  the Maximum Increment  in the Bill Rate, 1971:3-1974:2 
Billions of current  dollars 
Savings  and loan associations  Mutual  savings  banks 
Year 
and  Loss in  Cumulative  Loss in  Cumulative 
quarter  quarter  lossa  quarter  losss 
1971:3  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1 
4  0.7  0.9  0.3  0.4 
1972:1  1.9  2.7  0.9  1.3 
2  3.3  6.0  1.5  2.8 
3  4.5  10.5  2.1  4.8 
4  5.2  15.7  2.4  7.2 
1973:1  5.5  21.2  2.5  9.8 
2  5.6  26.8  2.6  12.3 
3  5.7  32.4  2.6  14.9 
4  5.7  38.1  2.6  17.6 
1974:1  5.7  43.8  2.6  20.2 
2  5.7  49.5  2.6  22.8 
Sources: Derived from demand functions in Table 1. See text for assumptions and appendix for data 
sources. 
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Table  4. Simulations  of Deposit  Losses  of Thrift  Institutions  Assuming 
the Maximum  Increment  in the Bank  Rate, 1971:3-1974:2 
Billions of current  dollars 
Savings  and  loan associations  Mutual  savings  banks 
Year 
and  Loss in  Cumulative  Loss in  Cumulative 
quiarter  quarter  lossa  quarter  loss" 
1971:3  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.3 
4  0.9  1.3  0.7  1.0 
1972:1  1.3  2.6  1.1  2.1 
2  1.4  4.0  1.1  3.2 
3  1.4  5.4  1.1  4.3 
4  1.4  6.9  1.1  5.4 
1973:1  1.5  8.3  1.2  6.6 
2  1.5  9.8  1.2  7.8 
3  1.5  11.3  1.2  9.0 
4  1.5  12.9  1.2  10.2 
1974:1  1.5  14.4  1.2  11.4 
2  1.5  15.9  1.2  12.6 
Sources: Same as Table 3. 
a.  Calculated from figures before rounding. 
Table  4 treats  the commercial  bank  rate  in a similar  fashion,  lifting  it by 
its maximum  three-quarter  rise of 1.54  percentage  points,  phased  in in the 
manner  described  above  for the maximum  change  in the bill rate.  This  case 
is referred  to as the maximum increment  in the bank rate. 
Table  5 gives  the results  for raising  the bill rate  above  its actual  path  by 
the mean  three-quarter  rise over the 1966-74  period-0.334 point (a case 
referred to as the mean increment  in the bill rate); and Table 6 deals with 
the bank  rate  similarly  (its  mean  rise  in the period  was  0.244  point,  and  this 
case is called the mean increment  in the bank rate). 
Table  3 demonstrates  that because  the public  lags in perceiving  and re- 
sponding  to the change  in open  market  rates,  several  quarters  elapse  before 
deposits  decline substantially.  But then the losses become indeed large: 
quarterly  decrements  exceed  past  record  levels  of losses  by the  second  quar- 
ter  after  the one  in  which  the  bill rate  begins  to rise  and  then  reach  extremely 
uncomfortable  levels. Five  quarters after the  process begins, losses 
exceed $5 billion per quarter  for savings  and loan associations  and $2 
billion for mutual savings  banks. These impacts  are the effects  beyond 
normal  growth  trends  from  income  and other  factors  and  therefore  do not 
mean  net deposit  losses  of these  full  magnitudes;  furthermore,  the bill rates William E. Gibson  615 
need  not remain  so high so long. But these  figures  do indicate  that deposit 
decrements  would  quickly  become  very  substantial  if the bill rate  remained 
up. 
Table  4 reveals  that  the smaller,  1.54  point,  rise  in the commercial  bank 
rate  has  a lesser  but  still  substantial  and  prompt  depressing  effect  on deposit 
flows.  The deposit  losses never  match  those for the bill rate  rise but once 
again  they exceed  record  outflows,  in this case four quarters  after  the in- 
crease  in the bank rate. 
Tables  5 and  6 reveal  the much  less  harmful  impact  from  the  mean  three- 
quarter  increases  in the bill and  the bank  rates.  After five quarters  the bill 
rate increases  produce  quarterly  deposit decrements  of $500 million for 
savings  and loan associations  and $250  million  for mutual  savings  banks, 
compared  with average  quarterly  inflows  from 1966:1  to 1974:2 of $3.76 
billion and $1.37 billion, respectively.  The other positive influences  on 
thrift  inflows  provide  a margin  adequate  to cushion  this type of shock, as 
is discussed  more  fully below. 
The  maximum  increment  in the bill rate  assumed  in Table  3 is plainly  an 
extreme  case, unlikely  to be sustained  indefinitely.  But it was intentionally 
selected  to explore  the effects  on deposit  flows  if the path of interest  rates 
Table 5.  Simulations  of Deposit Losses of Thrift Institutions  Assuming 
the Mean Increment  in the Bill Rate, 1971:3-1974:2 
Billions of current  dollars 
Savings  and loan associations  Mutual  savings  banks 
Year 
and  Loss in  Cumulative  Loss in  Cumulative 
quarter  quarter  lossa  quarter  lossa 
1971:3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
4  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0 
1972:1  0.2  0.3  0.1  0.1 
2  0.3  0.6  0.1  0.3 
3  0.4  1.0  0.2  0.5 
4  0.5  1.5  0.2  0.7 
1973:1  0.5  2.0  0.2  0.9 
2  0.5  2.6  0.2  1.2 
3  0.5  3.1  0.3  1.4 
4  0.5  3.7  0.3  1.7 
1974:1  0.5  4.2  0.3  2.0 
2  0.5  4.8  0.3  2.2 
Sources:  Same  as  Table  3. 
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Table 6.  Simulations  of Deposit Losses of Thrift Institutions  Assuming 
the Mean Increment  in the Bank Rate, 1971: 3-1974:2 
Billions  of current  dollars 
Savings  and  loan associations  Mutual  savings  banks 
Year 
and  Loss in  Cumulative  Loss in  Cumulative 
quarter  quarter  loss"  quarter  loss" 
1971:3  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
4  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.2 
1972:1  0.2  0.4  0.2  0.3 
2  0.2  0.6  0.2  0.5 
3  0.2  0.9  0.2  0.7 
4  0.2  1.1  0.2  0.9 
1973:1  0.2  1.3  0.2  1.0 
2  0.2  1.6  0.2  1.2 
3  0.2  1.8  0.2  1.4 
4  0.2  2.0  0.2  1.6 
1974:1  0.2  2.3  0.2  1.8 
2  0.2  2.5  0.2  2.0 
Sources: Same as Table 3. 
a.  Calculated from figures before rounding. 
were suddenly,  sharply,  and permanently  lifted. What would happen if 
open market  rates moved up rapidly  and declined  just as rapidly,  a not 
uncommon  occurrence?  Table 7 shows deposit  losses on the assumption 
that the bill rate is elevated  by 3.46 points in equal segments  over three 
quarters  beginning  1971:3  and  then is reduced  by the same  amount  at the 
same  pace. 
Because  of the delays  in depositors'  responses,  the outflows  never  reach 
the rate  induced  by the sustained  rise:  the worst  quarter-1972:3-is  less 
than 65 percent  of the more severe  quarters  reported  in Table 3, and the 
outflows  are particularly  sharp  in only three  quarters.  While  the accumu- 
lated  losses are considerable,  the impact  on thrift  institutions  is primarily 
one of inhibiting  growth  rather  than depressing  the industry. 
VARIABLE  RATE NOTES 
The estimates  obtained  here  are useful  in projecting  the impact  of vari- 
able interest  rate notes of small denominations,  first issued in 1974 by 
Citicorp,  the holding  company  of the First National City Bank of New 
York. This type of note has been viewed  as a special  threat  to deposits  at William E. Gibson  617 
Table 7.  Simulations  of Deposit Losses of Thrift Institutions  Assuming 
the Maximum Increment  in the Bill Rate Is Applied in Three Equal 
Steps Beginning  1971:3, and Then a Decline of the Same Amount 
and Speed to 1974:2 
Billions of current  dollars 
Savings  and loan associations  Mutual  savings  banks 
Year 
and  Loss in  Cumulative  Loss in  Cumulative 
quarter  quarter  loss"  quarter  loss" 
1971:3  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1 
4  0.7  0.9  0.3  0.4 
1972:1  1.8  2.7  0.9  1.3 
2  3.1  5.8  1.4  2.7 
3  3.7  9.5  1.7  4.4 
4  3.2  12.7  1.5  5.9 
1973:1  2.0  14.7  0.9  6.8 
2  0.8  15.6  0.4  7.2 
3  0.2  15.8  0.1  7.3 
4  0.0  15.8  0.0  7.3 
1974:1  0.0  15.8  0.0  7.3 
2  0.0  15.8  0.0  7.3 
Sources: Same as Table 3. 
a.  Calculated from figures before rounding. 
thrift  institutions  because  its yield  can  follow  market  rates  above  the Regu- 
lation Q-type  ceilings  applicable  to commercial  banks and thrift institu- 
tions. The notes can offer  this feature  because  they are obligations  of the 
bank holding company,  not the bank, and therefore  are not subject  to 
deposit interest  rate ceilings or reserve  requirements.20  As holding  com- 
pany  debt,  these  notes  are  not liabilities  of the banks  owned  by the holding 
companies  nor are  they protected  by federal  deposit  insurance.  They  have 
been  issued  in initial  lots of $5,000  or more  but they  can be sold in units  of 
$1,000 thereafter,  either back to the issuer or on the New York Stock 
Exchange,  where  they are listed.21 
Thrift  institutions  have  maintained  that,  in spite  of the legal  distinctions, 
these notes are for all practical  purposes  bank deposits  and as a result 
20. Bank  holding  company  debt  maturing  in less than seven  years  is subject  to reserve 
requirements,  but the notes issued  lately have had fifteen-year  maturities,  although  they 
can be redeemed  at the holder's  option within  two years  and every  six months  thereafter. 
21. The Citicorp  notes sold below  par  soon after  their  issue  in the summer  of 1974  and 
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should be subject  to interest  rate ceilings and reserve  requirements  (al- 
though  they  have  not sought  authority  to issue  similar  notes).  They argue 
that the generous  yields,  low denominations,  and  redemption  and  market- 
ability  features  make  such an attractive  package  that depositors  are with- 
drawing  funds  from thrift  institutions  to buy these notes. So far as I am 
aware,  there  is no firm  evidence  of this phenomenon  on a substantial  scale, 
but the elasticities  obtained  above should  cast light upon the likely  size of 
the response. 
The  yield  on these  notes  could  be determined  by any  number  of formulas, 
but even  though  both the banking  system  and  the capital  market  are  com- 
monly considered  highly competitive,  most of these issues have offered 
exactly  the same formula.  Apparently  it "works."  The formula  specifies 
an initial  stated  yield  of 9.70 percent  (first  obtained  by Citicorp  by applica- 
tion of the  formula  to May 1974  Treasury  bill  yields)  for  the first  year  or so, 
unless  the formula  dictates  a higher  rate in the second  half of that year. 
Thereafter  the yield is set 1 percentage  point above the average  yield on 
three-month  Treasury  bills,  reported  by the Federal  Reserve  Bank  of New 
York for the twenty-one  days  immediately  preceding  May 20 and Novem- 
ber 20, and this rate  is in effect  for the six months  beginning  the following 
June 15 and December  15, respectively.  After a holding  period  of about 
two years  the notes can be redeemed  at par each six months.22 
The  public's  response  to such  notes  depends  upon  whether  it views  them 
as a close substitute  for Treasury  bills or for commercial  bank  deposits,  or 
as an instrument  different  from  and  riskier  than  either  of these.  Since  it is a 
new product,  history  offers  little guidance.  Most likely, they are seen as 
much  like Treasury  bills or bank  deposits.  An idea of their  effect  on thrift 
deposits  can be gleaned  by simulating  increases  in each of these  two rates. 
This approach  assumes  that these notes become  a widespread  alternative 
to other  market  instruments-a degree  of prominence  that they have yet 
to reach-and that they will be issued  in whatever  volume  the public  de- 
mands  at a fixed  set of terms.  In the first  exercise,  the notes  are  assumed  to 
be close but not perfect  substitutes  for Treasury  bills.  To approximate  this 
relationship  the  rate  that  would  have  been  paid  on these  notes  is reduced  by 
0.25  point  and  the bill rate  coefficients  are  applied  to the resulting  rate.  The 
22. The minimum  holding period  first  proposed  by Citicorp  was only six months. It 
was extended  after  correspondence  between  the chairmen  of Citicorp  and of the Board 
of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System,  and the Federal  Reserve  then withdrew  its 
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quarter-point  reduction  reflects  the fact that these notes are not U.S. 
government  obligations  and  do not enjoy  all  the  special  features  of Treasury 
bills, particularly  the highly  developed  market.  The reduction  is no larger 
because  the notes  do offer  the convenience  of zero  reinvestment  costs and, 
for  holders  who  possess  the  actual  notes  (rather  than  leaving  them  with  their 
brokers),  lower  redemption  charges.  One feature  of the formula  is that it 
locks the yield  in for six months  based  on interest  rate  patterns  over  three 
weeks.  Accordingly,  during  periods  of sharply  rising  interest  rates  the yield 
on bills could  exceed  that on the notes, and at such  times  the public  is un- 
likely  to buy many  notes.  In the simulation,  the actual  Treasury  bill rate  is 
substituted  for the formula  yield less 0.25 point whenever  the latter is 
below the bill rate. Simulations  based on the post-1965  estimates  from 
Table 1 for this case appear  in Table 8. Deposit losses are quite  modest 
when  compared  with  those  of earlier  simulations.  The  decrement  to depos- 
Table 8.  Simulations  of Deposit Losses of Thrift Institutions  Assuming 
That Variable Rate Notes Are Prevalent Beginning 1971:3, and 
Substitute for Treasury  Bills, 1971:3-1974:2 
Billions of current  dollars 
Savings  and  loan associations  Mutual  savings  banks 
Year 
and  Loss in  Cumulative  Loss in  Cumulative 
quarter  quarter  lossa  quarter  lossa 
1971:3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
4  0.1  0.1  *  * 
1972:1  0.4  0.5  0.2  0.2 
2  1.0  1.5  0.5  0.7 
3  1.3  2.8  0.7  1.4 
4  1.2  4.1  0.6  2.0 
1973:1  0.7  4.8  0.4  2.3 
2  0.3  5.0  0.1  2.4 
3  *  5.1  *  2.5 
4  0.0  5.1  0.0  2.5 
1974:1  0.2  5.3  0.1  2.6 
2  0.5  5.7  0.2  2.8 
Sources: Derived from demand functions in Table 1. The rates on variable-rate notes used in the simu- 
lation were calculated on the basis of the formula in the Chase Manhattan Corporation offering prospectus 
cited in the appendix-that  is, they are based on average rates on three-month  Treasury  bills for the twenty- 
one days ending May 20 and November 20 and the resulting rate applies for the six-month periods begin- 
ning the following June 15 and December 15, respectively. 
a.  Calculated from figures before rounding. 
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Table 9.  Simulations of Deposit Losses of Thrift Institutions  Assuming 
That Variable Rate Notes Are Prevalent Beginning 1971:3, and 
Substitute  for Commercial  Bank Deposits, 1971:3-1974:2 
Billions  of current  dollars 
Savings  and  loan associations  Mutual  savings  banks 
Year 
and  Loss in  Cumulative  Loss in  Cumulative 
quarter  quarter  lossa  quarter  lossa 
1971:3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1972:1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1973:1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
2  0.1  0.1  *  * 
3  0.0  0.1  0.0  * 
4  *  0.1  *  0.1 
1974:1  1.5  1.6  1.2  1.3 
2  1.6  3.2  1.3  2.6 
Sources: Same as Table 3. 
a.  Calculated from figures before rounding. 
* Less than 0.05. 
its in savings  and  loan associations  does exceed  $1 billion  for two quarters, 
but by and  large  the results  are  most  nearly  comparable  to the mean  rise  in 
the bill rate. 
Table  9 reports  deposit  losses  simulated  on the assumption  that a rise  in 
the rate  on commercial  bank  certificates  is more  relevant  to the attractive- 
ness of the notes. In these  simulations,  the bank  household  certificate  rate 
is set equal  to 0.25 percentage  point below the formula  rate or the actual 
bank  rate,  whichever  is greater,  beginning  in 1971:3.  The rate  was not set 
at the full formula  rate  because  the notes are not liabilities  of banks,  and 
thus  lack  deposit  insurance  and  hence  are  somewhat  riskier.  Table  9 shows 
minimal  outflows  from thrift  deposits  to notes until 1974,  when  the Trea- 
sury  bill  rate  rose  well  above  commercial  bank  deposit  rates.  Until  then,  the 
note yields  (0.75 percentage  point above  bill yields  on the assumptions  of 
the table)  would  not have  been more  attractive  than  commercial  bank  de- 
posit  rates  to anyone  who viewed  the notes as substitutes  for commercial 
bank  deposits.  The particular  structure  of interest  rates  in the first  half of 
1974 probably  accounts  for the belief of the thrift institutions  that the William  E. Gibson  621 
primary threat of notes comes from the public's confusing them with com- 
mercial bank deposits. In fact, the threat typically comes from their being 
viewed as open market securities. 
In perspective, these maximum deviations are substantial. Indeed, they 
are too substantial  to be relevant to the present context because only about 
$11/2  billion of variable rate notes have been issued and recent sales have 
required an increase in the yields. These estimates assume that the notes 
become very much more widespread than they now are, and this develop- 
ment will require  many more issues. The import of the estimates is that the 
proliferation of such notes need not mean a massive drain on thrift de- 
posits, particularly if the deposit interest rates are allowed to rise. While 
quarterly losses of savings and loan deposits of $1 billion are not trivial, 
they are far different from the losses of $10 billion to $20 billion that were 
predicted when the new instrument was first proposed. 
LOSSES AND  GROWTH 
Substantial as these implied losses are, they must be put in perspective. 
Both savings and loan  associations and mutual savings banks have en- 
joyed strong deposit growth since 1952 in general and since 1965 in par- 
ticular. From  1966:1  to  1974:2  savings and loan  associations  had  an 
average quarterly  inflow of deposits of $3.76 billion, while mutual savings 
banks averaged $1.37 billion.23  The decrements  to deposits predicted  above 
must be interpreted  as deviations both from a fairly prosperous trend and 
from actual experience. 
Table 10 compares actual deposits with those resulting from the cumu- 
lative deposit decrements. Two of the assumptions about the Treasury bill 
rate, those involving the mean rise and the rising then falling rate (shown 
in columns 2 and 3), do not imply any decline in deposits but merely slower 
growth-temporarily  in the latter and permanently  in the former case, and 
even so the size of the reduction is quite modest. Only the sustained maxi- 
mum rise in the bill rate causes deposits to fall at all, and then the decline 
starts rather late-1973:3  for  savings and loan  associations (a  difficult 
quarter  for them anyway), 1973: 1 for mutual savings banks. The drops to- 
ward the end of the period represent an extreme case and result from a 
double dose of sharply rising interest rates: the simulated ones plus those 
23. Mutual savings bank deposits at the end of 1965 were about half the size of 
savings  and loan deposits, so that the mutuals  have experienced  less exuberant  deposit 
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Table 10. Actual Deposits in Thrift Institutions,  and Actual Less 
Cumulative  Decrements  from Various Shocks Arising from the 
Bill Rate, 1971:3-1974:2 
Billions  of current  dollars 
Actual  less decrement  from selected  shock 
Year 
and  Actual  Mean rise  Rise and  fall  Maximum  rise 
quarter  deposits  in bill ratea  in bill rateb  in bill ratec 
Savings  and loan associations 
1971:3  169.3  169.3  169.1  169.1 
4  174.9  174.8  174.0  174.0 
1972:1  185.2  185.0  182.5  182.5 
2  192.6  192.0  186.8  186.6 
3  200.7  199.7  191.2  190.2 
4  208.3  206.8  195.6  192.6 
1973:1  216.0  213.9  201.2  194.8 
2  221.7  219.1  206.1  194.9 
3  223.3  220.2  207.6  190.9 
4  228.8  225.1  213.0  190.7 
1974:1  235.6  231.4  219.8  191.8 
2  238.4  233.6  222.6  188.9 
Mutual  savings  banks 
1971:3  79.4  79.4  79.3  79.3 
4  81.5  81.5  81.1  81.1 
1972:1  84.8  84.6  83.5  83.5 
2  87.2  87.0  84.6  84.5 
3  89.7  89.2  85.3  84.9 
4  92.2  91.5  86.4  85.0 
1973:1  94.6  93.6  87.8  84.8 
2  96.2  95.0  89.0  83.9 
3  96.3  94.8  89.0  81.3 
4  96.9  95.2  89.7  79.4 
1974:1  99.0  97.0  91.7  78.8 
2  99.3  97.1  92.0  76.5 
Sources: Actual-see  appendix; decrements-Tables  5, 7, 3, respectively. Also see text. 
a.  1966-74 average three-quarter  rise. 
b. Historical maximum three-quarter  rise, and fall of same amount. 
c.  Historical maximum three-quarter  rise. 
that actually  took place and depressed  experienced  growth.  By and large, 
the estimates  imply  that thrift  institutions  would be able to handle  fairly 
severe  increases  in interest  rates. Particularly  since rates typically  decline 
for a period  after  a sharp  rise,  the worst-case  scenario  is improbable-that William E. Gibson  623 
is, market  interest  rates  are unlikely  to rise  by record  margins  and remain 
that high indefinitely. 
One shortcoming  of the numbers  in Table 10 is the underlying  assump- 
tion that rates  paid by commercial  banks  remain  fixed.  This may or may 
not be realistic,  depending  upon the banking  supervisors.  On the chance 
that it is not, Table 11 repeats  the calculations  of Table 10 but assumes 
that mean and maximum  increases  in the bill rate are matched  by mean 
and maximum  increases  in the commercial  bank rate. Once again the 
effects  of mean increases  are mild, but the combination  of the two maxi- 
mum increases  deeply depresses  deposits, although  again the decline is 
delayed  because  of the laggard  response  to the bill rate. 
Adjusting  to Deposit  Losses 
The thrust  of the results  reported  in Tables 10 and 11 is that all but 
extreme  rises in interest  rates only dampen  the growth  of thrift  deposits, 
rather  than  inducing  large  deposit  outflows.  Still,  as the last  columns  of the 
tables  indicate,  sizable  net losses are possible  if rates  rise far enough  and 
remain  high  long  enough.  In addition,  when  interest  rates  rise  thrift  institu- 
tions typically  have some mortgage  loan commitments  outstanding,  and 
have  to scramble  for funds  to meet  them  out of inflows  that are  lower  than 
were  expected  at the time  the commitments  were  made.  On the other  hand, 
the bulk of the cash inflow  to the institutions  is in mortgage  repayments, 
which  are  unaffected  by the movements  in market  rates.24  Neither  class of 
institution  is likely to suffer  deposit losses in excess of $5 billion net of 
lending commitments and mortgage repayments.25  In any case this figure 
provides a guide to assessing the cost of adjustment. 
24. To put these flows in perspective,  in the third quarter  of 1973  cash mortgage  re- 
payments  to savings  and  loan associations  totaled $7.5 billion,  while  outstanding  commit- 
ments averaged  $12.3 billion. Monthly extensions  of new commitments  fell from $4.4 
billion in June to $1.2 billion in September,  while total commitments  outstanding  fell 
from $14.4 billion to $10.7 billion; mortgage  loans made fell from $5.7 billion to $3.2 
billion. The associations  were able to cut back their lending sharply  in response  to the 
slowing of deposit inflows but did not, and probably  could not, arrest  the outflow of 
mortgage  funds. Accordingly,  some adjustment  burden  probably  remained. 
25. The same figure  is used for mutual  savings banks and savings  and loan associa- 
tions because deposits of the former, while smaller,  are proportionately  more interest 
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Table  11.  Actual  Deposits  in Thrift  Institutions,  and Actual  Less 
Cumulative Decrements  from Increase  in the Rates  on Both 
Three-Month  Treasury  Bills  and Commercial  Bank  Deposits, 
1971:3-1974:2 
Billions of current  dollars 
Actual  less decrement  from selected  shock 
Year  Mean rise in  Maximum  rise in 
and  Actual  both  bill and  both  bill and 
quarter  deposits  bank  ratesa  bank  ratesb 
Savings  and loan associctions 
1971:3  169.3  169.2  168.7 
4  174.9  174.6  172.7 
1972:1  185.2  184.5  179.9 
2  192.6  191.4  182.6 
3  200.7  198.8  184.8 
4  208.3  205.7  185.7 
1973:1  216.0  212.6  186.5 
2  221.7  217.5  185.1 
3  223.3  218.4  179.6 
4  228.8  223.1  177.8 
1974:1  235.6  229.1  177.4 
2  238.4  231.1  173.0 
Mutual  savings  banks 
1971:3  79.4  79.3  78.9 
4  81.5  81.3  80.1 
1972:1  84.8  84.3  81.4 
2  87.2  86.5  81.3 
3  89.7  88.6  80.6 
4  92.2  90.7  79.5 
1973:1  94.6  92.6  78.2 
2  96.2  93.8  76.1 
3  96.3  93.4  72.3 
4  96.9  93.6  69.2 
1974:1  99.0  95.2  67.4 
2  99.3  95.1  63.9 
Sources: Actual-see  appendix; decrements-Tables  5, 6, and 3, 4, respectively. Also see text. 
a.  1966-74 average three-quarter  rise. 
b. Historical maximum three-quarter  rise. William E. Gibson  625 
Faced with deposit outflows of these proportions, thrift institutions have 
three basic alternative ways of  adjusting: (1) raise the rates they pay on 
deposits to  stem the  outflows;  (2) borrow the lost  funds from  another 
source; and (3) sell assets in proportion to the runoff of liabilities. 
RAISE  DEPOSIT  RATES 
The most obvious remedy for an outflow is an increase in the rates thrift 
institutions pay on their deposits. This step requires the consent of regula- 
tors and probably cannot now be taken without an increase in commercial 
bank rates as well. Still, it would help thrift institutions to attract deposits 
back. Table 12 simulates the impact of a 1 percentage point rise in the rates 
thrift institutions pay on their deposits in the case of the maximum rise in 
the bill rate. Historically, this is a very large jump in saving rates, but then 
Table 12. Simulations  of Deposit Losses of Thrift Institutions  Relative 
to Control Predictions,  Assuming  Selected Rises in Rates on Three- 
Month Treasury  Bills, Own Deposits, and Commercial  Bank Deposits, 
1971 :3-1974:2a 
Billions of current  dollars 
Savings and loan associations  Mutual savings banks 
Year 
and  Loss in  Cumulative  Loss in  Cumulative 
quarter  quarter  loSSb  quarter  loSSb 
1971:3  -0.4  -0.4  0.0  0.0 
4  -1  .1  -1  .5  -0.  1  -0.1 
1972:1  -2.0  -3.6  -0.1  -0.2 
2  -2.0  -5.5  0.2  0.1 
3  -1.2  -6.7  0.7  0.8 
4  -0.3  -6.9  1.2  1.9 
1973:1  0.1  -6.9  1.3  3.3 
2  0.1  -6.8  1.4  4.6 
3  0.1  -6.7  1.4  6.0 
4  0.1  -6.7  1.4  7.4 
1974:1  0.1  -6.6  1.4  8.8 
2  0.1  -6.5  1.4  10.2 
Sources: Same as Table 3. 
a.  The assumed rises are 3.46 percentage points for three-month Treasury bills, 1.00 percentage point 
for own rate, and 0.75 percentage  point for commercial bank deposits. 
b. Calculated from data before rounding. 626  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1974 
so is that for the bill rate. In these simulations commercial bank rates were 
assumed to rise by 75 basis points as well, because the rates usually move 
together. A rise of 100 basis points in the bank rate might be more realistic, 
but thrift institutions are assumed to receive a political favor here in light 
of the severity of the situation. 
Because of the strong own-rate response of savings and loan deposits, 
the rise in their rates more than offsets the negative impact of increases in 
the bill rate and the commercial bank rate, so that they enjoy a deposit 
inflow. Mutual savings banks are not so fortunate but they are still able to 
curb the outflow. To stabilize deposit flows, mutual savings banks would 
have to raise their rate by 1.50 points. The results (in billions of dollars) for 
this simulation were as follows: 
Year and  Loss in  Cumulative 
quarter  quarter  loss 
1971:3  -0.1  -0.1 
4  -0.3  -0.4 
1972:1  -0.6  -1.1 
2  -0.6  -1.7 
3  -0.2  -1.8 
4  0.3  -1.6 
1973:1  0.4  -  1.2 
2  0.4  -0.8 
3  0.4  -0.3 
4  0.4  0.1 
1974:1  0.4  0.5 
2  0.4  0.9 
While successful at holding deposits, such action would be costly-the 
reason the thrift institutions have opposed  it  so  vehemently. Based on 
1973:4 deposits, the rise of 1 percentage point would add $2.28 billion and 
$825 million (at annual rates) to the costs of savings and loan associations 
and mutual savings banks, respectively; in 1973 the net worth of savings 
and loan associations grew $1,786 million and net operating income of mu- 
tual savings banks after expenses, taxes, and interest amounted to $673.1 
million. While these interest rates were rising, the yields on assets that thrift 
institutions invest in  would  also  be  rising, although not  as rapidly, as 
Figure 2 shows. On balance, however, the very large increase in deposit 
rates that would be necessary to stabilize deposits would in effect wipe out William  E. Gibson  627 
the earnings of  the industry until the attrition of  old mortgages raised 
average yields on mortgage portfolios sufficiently to  offset the impact of 
added deposit costs. 
BORROW  FROM  OTHER  SOURCES 
A common means of replacing outflows of deposit liabilities is to borrow 
from other sources. In the case of savings and loan associations, the Federal 
Home Loan Bank System operates a large and active program of advances 
and encourages members to borrow. In fact, the terms of some advances 
range up to ten years, with prepayment  penalties to discourage associations 
from repaying when deposit inflows resume.26  Although it does not lack 
the desire, the system lacks the means of subsidizing advances on a large 
scale. As a result, the rates savings and loan associations must pay tend 
to reflect the system's costs of borrowing, which during periods of high and 
rising interest rates tend to be above yields on new mortgages, and even 
more above those on existing mortgages. 
In the third quarter  of 1973 the Home Loan Banks charged an average of 
8.13 percent on new advances, while the average dividend rate paid on 
deposits by member savings and loan associations was 5.59 percent. In the 
second half of 1969 the margin between these two rates was roughly 200 
basis points. If the Treasury bill rate were to rise as it does in the most 
extreme case simulated above, it seems reasonable to assume that the mar- 
gin would approximate the 1973 experience. To replace the equivalent of 
$5 billion of deposits by borrowing, savings and loan associations would 
incur additional annual costs of $127 million. Since an equally efficacious 
rise in deposit rates would cost them $2.28 billion a year, it is no wonder 
that  savings and loan  associations have never favored raising the rate 
ceilings. 
Most mutual savings banks are in a much less comfortable position be- 
cause they do not have the well-organized borrowing opportunities avail- 
able to savings and loan associations. Of the 482 banks in the United States, 
only 48 belong to the Federal Home  Loan Bank System and none is a 
member of the Federal Reserve System. With the high interest elasticities 
26. Presumably,  the penalties  are  meant  to encourage  associations  to lend new inflows 
in the mortgage  market  rather  than retrenching  and paying off debt. 628  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1974 
of its deposits the industry is potentially more exposed than the savings 
and loan industry. Mutual savings banks can and do borrow from com- 
mercial banks, but commercial banks are most reluctant to lend to them 
precisely when they  need  the  funds most-when  funds  are scarce and 
costly.  Commercial banks also take  a harder look  at credit risks than 
do  the Home  Loan Banks, so that mutual savings banks might not  be 
able to  borrow the  full  amount  of  their deposit  losses  as  savings and 
loan associations can. If they could, however, it would be rather costly. 
In  the  third  quarter of  1973,  the  commercial  bank  prime  rate  was 
roughly 4  percentage points  above  the  yield  on  mutual  savings bank 
portfolios.  Assuming that this  spread held,  borrowing to  replace a  $5 
billion deposit loss would add about $200 million to costs annually. 
SELL  ASSETS 
The thrift institutions can also adjust to deposit losses by paring assets, 
typically by selling mortgages when home buyers find mortgages most diffi- 
cult  to  obtain.  Indeed,  Home  Loan  Bank  advances were designed  to 
save the mortgage market from these impacts. Mutual savings banks are 
somewhat better off on this score: they have greater latitude in the assets 
they may hold, and in particular they may hold corporate bonds in many 
states. But selling a corporate bond at periods of high interest rates usually 
entails a capital loss, and since data on corporate bond holdings and yields 
for mutual savings banks are incomplete, I have approximated costs by 
assuming that all the thrift institutions sell mortgages. Their opportunities 
for doing so  are not  vast. The Federal National  Mortgage Association 
(FNMA)  and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) 
buy insured and conventional mortgage loans, but only if they are less than 
a year old. The alternative  is to sell loans in the open market at a discount. 
Such distress sales usually carry a discount higher than is required simply 
to boost the yield to match that on new loans, partly because the circum- 
stances of the borrower and, to a lesser extent, of the property may have 
changed since the origination of the loan. Typically, the discount runs about 
1  1/2 points beyond what is required to bring the yield in line with market 
rates. 
Federal agencies cannot be relied upon to take all the mortgages that 
might be offered for sale in response to deposit losses. The largest volume 
of residential  mortgage purchases  in one year by FNMA was $6.1 billion in William E. Gibson  629 
1973, and the largest by FHLMC was $820 million in 1972.27 Accommo- 
dating the entire amount of mortgages that either of the severe distress 
simulations imply would be for sale would therefore be beyond the scope 
of the operations of these agencies. Suppose, as arbitrary  assumptions, that 
half  of  the mortgages are sold to  FNMA  and FHLMC,  and yield an 
average of 8 percent, and half in the open market at a 1  '/2-point discount 
(the yield and yield differential of the third quarter of  1973).28  On these 
assumptions, the one-time capital loss from liquidating $5 billion of assets 
would be about $310 million. 
Comparison of the costs of these alternative methods of adjusting to 
deposit losses suggests that thrift institutions should prefer borrowing to 
selling assets, and selling assets to raising deposit rates. In reality, the in- 
stitutions have opposed raising deposit rates, even when that action might 
have pulled in substantial amounts of funds from the open market. The 
comparative costs pinpoint the reason. The added costs of rate increases, 
based  on 1973:4  deposit  levels,  would  exceed  1973  earnings  for both sets  of 
institutions.  The other  forms of adjustment,  on the other  hand, could be 
carried  out comfortably  within  the 1973  earnings  of both.  If the increases  in 
rates  on market  instruments  and  commercial  bank  deposits  lasted  beyond  a 
year, however,  these financing  costs would begin to be substantial,  par- 
ticularly for institutions  with more interest-elastic  deposits, and they 
would  thus probably  inhibit  mortgage  lending  operations. 
Conclusions 
In general  the thrift  institutions  in the United States  constitute  a viable 
industry.  Deposit flows are responsive  enough to interest  rates on sub- 
stitutes  to make  life at thrift  institutions  a challenge,  but  they  do not appear 
to be sensitive  enough  to threaten  widespread  bankruptcies,  at least  as long 
as interest  rates  remain  within  historical  ranges. 
While,  under  the assumptions  of the simulations  reported  here,  the thrift 
institutions  remain  viable,  in the sense  that  they  do not fail on average,  the 
27. The figure  for FNMA represents  gross mortgage  purchases.  Net of repayments, 
the highest  net investment  in mortgages  was $4.3 billion, also in 1973. Total mortgage 
purchases  by FHLMC were actually $1,297 million in 1972, but the agency also sold 
$407 million in mortgages  that year. 
28. I assume here that regulators  permit  this sale of assets at realized  capital losses, 
but some difference  of opinion exists on whether  they would do so. 630  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1974 
deposit  responses  to interest  rate increases  imply that these institutions 
cannot  continue  with business  as usual. In face of stagnant  or declining 
deposit  trends,  they are likely  to withdraw  from  mortgage  lending  during 
periods  of rising rates, leaving a huge void that cannot immediately  be 
filled  by other  lenders.  While  the disruption  of homebuilding  and  mortgage 
financing  is not so serious  as the failure  of thousands  of financial  institu- 
tions,  it poses  an issue  for policymakers  whose  aim  lately  has been  to avoid 
severe  constraints  in the availability  of mortgage  financing.  On the basis  of 
past  experience,  then,  the response  to the weakened  viability-in the sense 
used here-would be additional  federal  support  of the mortgage  market, 
either  temporary  or permanent. 
Everyone  concerned-the government  and its budget  makers,  the thrift 
institutions  and their regulators,  and the mortgage  market-would be 
better  off if these  institutions  could  sustain  their  earnings  and  lending  when 
interest  rates rise. Under any probable  structure  of operations,  they are 
likely  to suffer  reduced  earnings  in such  times,  but the unfavorable  impacts 
can  be mitigated  by any  combination  of (1) reducing  the average  maturities 
of assets,  (2) extending  maturities  of liabilities,  and  (3) establishing  ways  of 
raising  the return  to longer-term  assets  when  rates  rise. These  considera- 
tions point to broader  portfolio  powers  for thrift  institutions  on the asset 
side and to greater  use of variable  rate  mortgages. 
Without some such measures,  thrift institutions  will remain  prone to 
difficult  times and disruption  of their support  for the mortgage  market. 
Recent  experience  offers  no comforting  expectation  that interest  rates  will 
become less volatile; if anything,  they are likely to become  more so. In 
addition, deposits have become ever more sensitive  to market  rates in 
recent  years  as yields  on low-risk  substitutes  have  reached  levels  compara- 
ble to those on thrift  deposits. 
Finally,  adding  to the pressure  from  established  substitutes  is the inven- 
tion of new ones. The most recent  has been money  market  mutual  funds, 
which invest in commercial  paper and negotiable  certificates  of deposit 
and  thus  pass  along  to smaller  savers  the benefit  of high  interest  rates.  The 
rapid growth  of these funds dates from the first half of 1974,  and their 
impact  has not been measured  in this study.  But as long as deposit  rates 
offered  by thrift institutions  remain  below open market  rates  the market 
will have an incentive  to develop alternative  outlets for savers. Thrift 
deposits  will feel these pressures  until they can provide  fully competitive 
earnings  during  periods  of rising  rates. William  E. Gibson  631 
APPENDIX 
Definitions  of Symbols  and 
Sources  of Data 
CG  =  Capital  gains  of households,  defined  as the change  in household 
net worth  from the beginning  of a quarter  to the beginning  of 
the  next  quarter,  less  personal  saving  over  the quarter,  in billions 
of current  dollars.  Source:  Board  of Governors  of the Federal 
Reserve  System. 
ib5  =  Weighted  average  three-month  Treasury  bill rate with weights 
1, 2, 3, 2, and 1 on the current  and past four quarters,  respec- 
tively, in percentage  points. Source:  bill rate  from  Federal  Re- 
serve Bulletin, various issues. 
ic=  Rate paid on commercial  bank passbook accounts through 
1967;  thereafter  the maximum  rate paid on certificates  of de- 
posit, in percentage  points.  Source:  Board  of Governors  of the 
Federal  Reserve  System. 
iSB3  =  Unweighted  average  of current  and past two quarters'  average 
rates paid on mutual savings bank deposits, in percentage 
points.  Rate  for each  deposit  class  is weighted  by the volume  of 
deposits  in that class. Source:  Federal  Deposit Insurance  Cor- 
poration. 
iSL3  =  Unweighted  average  of current  and past two quarters'  average 
rates  paid on savings  and loan deposits  (which  are weighted  by 
deposit  volumes),  in percentage  points. Source:  Federal  Home 
Loan Bank  Board. 
SSB  =  Stock  of mutual  savings  bank  deposits  divided  by household  net 
worth. Both series  obtained  from Board of Governors  of the 
Federal  Reserve  System;  in billions  of current  dollars. 
SSL  =  Stock  of savings  and  loan association  deposits  divided  by house- 
hold net worth.  Source:  same  as SSB. 
t  =  current quarter. 
ASSB  =  SSBt  -  SSBt-1. 632  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1974 
ASSL =  SSLt  -  SSLt  1. 
W =  Net worth  of households,  in billions  of current  dollars.  Source: 
Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System. 
YD = Disposable  income,  in billions  of current  dollars.  Source:  Survey 
of Current  Business, various issues. 
The pro forma  yields on variable  interest  rate notes are those used in the 
prospectus  of the Chase  Manhattan  Corporation,  dated  August  2, 1974,  for 
a floating  rate note issue. Comments  and 
Discussion 
James  L. Pierce: I want  to congratulate  William  Gibson  for developing  a 
reasonable  structure  for the determination  of deposit  flows  into thrift  insti- 
tutions.  Nonetheless,  I am  troubled  by a few  aspects  of the  equations  under- 
lying his simulations.  First, although  I see the sense of introducing  a lag 
for the perception  of interest  rates,  I am puzzled  about  the interpretation 
of a double  lag process.  According  to Gibson, stocks adjust  with a dis- 
tributed  lag even after  people  finally  perceive  changes  in interest  rates. 
Second,  I am concerned  about  Gibson's  practice  of fishing  for the right 
length  of lags and choosing  different  lags for different  components  for no 
reason  except  that they  fit better.  On the other  hand,  he allows  for no dis- 
tributed  lag on capital  gains,  and yet I could  imagine  that they too would 
exert  their  effect  only gradually. 
Finally,  the variables  for interest  rates  on thrift  deposits  present  a pecu- 
liar  problem.  Since  the innovation  of certificates,  the average  interest  rate 
paid by a thrift  institution  depends  on the mixture  of its deposits  in the 
passbook  and  the certificate  forms  as well  as the maturity  of its certificates. 
Thus, a shift of deposits  from lower- into higher-yielding  certificates  in 
itself  raises  the average  interest  rate.  In effect,  the depositor  is determining 
by his own actions  both the quantity  of deposits  and the interest  rate. I 
view  this as a very difficult  problem,  for which  I do not have a solution. 
But  I would  be cautious  in interpreting  Gibson's  finding  of increased  sensi- 
tivity  of deposits  to the interest  rate  in recent  years  because  his interest  rate 
variable  has become  a less and less reliable  measure  since  the mid-sixties. 
One of the more important,  if less surprising,  substantive  findings  in 
Gibson's  paper  is that  raising  interest  rates  is the most costly  way  for thrift 
institutions  to adjust  to the problems  created  by tight money.  That helps 
explain  why the institutions  want  the government  to maintain  ceilings  on 
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interest  rates  and thus  to head off competitive  pressures  on them  to make 
that costly  adjustment. 
I consider  it important  to distinguish  the effects  of these  interest  ceilings 
in creating  distortions  in the overall  economy  and financial  markets  from 
their implications  for disruption  in the mortgage  market.  In general,  I 
don't  follow  the argument  that savings  and loan associations  should  have 
authority  to purchase  a wider  variety  of assets in order  to stabilize  the 
mortgage  market.  It may well be true that the associations  would have 
"more  viable"  earnings-which is a polite way of saying  more assurance 
of positive  earnings-if they had the authority  to make consumer  loans 
and  to buy other  kinds  of assets.  But I don't  see how that would  make  the 
mortgage  market  more  stable.  Under  those  circumstances,  the associations 
would  clearly  be better  able to afford  to buy mortgages  in periods  of high 
interest  rates;  but they  probably  would  not in fact buy them,  because  they 
would  find  other  assets  even  more  attractive.  Commercial  banks  currently 
swing  in and out of mortgages  in response  to changes  in relative  market 
yields.  Indeed,  their  sizable  portfolio  shifts  are  a major  source  of instability 
in the mortgage  market. 
Such  shifts  may have  favorable  effects  on the overall  efficiency  of finan- 
cial  markets  and  yet  be bad  for  the  mortgage  market.  The  right  prescription 
for stabilizing  mortgage  markets  and  homebuilding  is one set of changes  in 
institutional  arrangements;  and that for making  overall  financial  markets 
as efficient  as possible  is a very  different  set. The two goals  are  conflicting, 
and pursuit  of overall  financial  efficiency  may well involve  the cost of even 
greater  fluctuations  in the mortgage  market  than are now experienced. 
General  Discussion 
Several  of the participants  commented  on specific  aspects  of the equa- 
tions underlying  the simulations  in the paper.  Lawrence  Klein observed 
that he would expect the inflation  rate to influence  consumer  portfolio 
choices  and wished  that Gibson  had explored  that possibility.  A high rate 
of inflation,  he felt, would  push money out of thrift  institutions  into real 
assets.  F. Thomas  Juster  agreed  with Klein that the effect of inflation  on 
thrift  institution  deposits  should  be studied;  but he expressed  his  judgment 
that  the relationship  would  turn  out to be positive.  Overall  saving  seems  to 
be positively  influenced  by the rate of inflation,  and periods  of strongly William E. Gibson  635 
rising prices tend to be associated with a shift of assets toward safety and 
security even at the sacrifice of protection against the losses imposed by 
inflation. 
More specifically,  Juster  conjectured  that if an expected inflation variable 
were added to the equation, it might occupy the role Gibson assigned to 
the capital gains variable. William Poole and David Fand both felt that a 
disaggregation of thrift accounts into passbook and certificate types might 
reveal that the real sensitivity, or "hot money" characteristics, lay in the 
certificate (or time) accounts; such a finding would point to a heightened 
average degree of interest sensitivity at present, as a result of the recent rise 
in the share of certificates in total thrift accounts. 
Franco Modigliani commented on the absence from Gibson's statistical 
work of an analysis of the deposit substitution between mutual  savings 
banks, on the one hand, and savings and loan associations, on the other. 
In point of fact, these two types of thrift institutions offer assets that must 
be extremely close substitutes; but for that very reason their interest rates 
do not diverge enough to permit a statistical discrimination of the cross- 
effect. Daniel Brill felt, however, that the two types of institutions may be 
less competitive than Modigliani supposed, because mutual savings banks 
operate only in some states and tend to be dominant in most  of  those. 
Stephen Marston was concerned about the possible inefficiency of using a 
moving average as a summary for lags fitted by the Almon technique, par- 
ticularly when that technique had been applied in a single-equation variant 
and the moving average was then incorporated into the "seemingly unre- 
lated" technique of estimation. 
In response to some of these points Gibson explained that he had been 
seeking a general pragmatic formulation of the demand for thrift accounts 
that was fairly robust rather than a precise, definitive set of equations. He 
told Marston that a wide variety of preliminary regressions generated co- 
efficients that  permitted some  reasonable approximation by  a  moving 
average of interest rates. The preliminary results also suggested to  him 
that, in fact, two kinds of lags were operating-those  involved in perceiving 
interest rates and those involved in adjusting actual to  desired deposits. 
Contrary to what Pierce implied, Gibson found a double lag process quite 
plausible. He shared Pierce's concerns about the difficulties of interpreting 
the average interest rates on thrift deposits when these reflected the mix of 
accounts chosen by depositors, but saw no solution to that problem. As 
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seemed an attractive solution in principle; but doing so had given Gibson 
unstable and unreliable results. 
Another portion of the discussion focused on the interpretation of find- 
ings about the behavior of savers. Klein cautioned against interpreting  the 
changes in coefficients after 1966 as a change in the structure of household 
behavior. Conceivably, a  sufficiently complicated relationship that  had 
room for nonlinear or threshold effects would reveal that people were 
merely adapting to a different set of options associated with new money 
market instruments  rather  than behaving differently  in any structural  sense. 
The elasticity of response of fluctuations of interest rates in a narrow range 
around fairly low values was low then and might be low today. 
George  Perry wondered whether the practice of  crediting interest to 
thrift accounts as an automatic accrual tended to increase the apparent 
sensitivity of deposits to their own interest rate. If people display inertia, 
then their thrift accounts will grow more rapidly as a result of higher inter- 
est rates simply because they leave that extra interest on deposit. Gibson 
reported, however, that experiments with a redefined stock of deposits that 
netted out credited interest had negligible effects on the coefficients. 
Recalling the earlier experience with Treasury bills of small denomina- 
tions, Pierce foresaw that the newly created money market mutual funds 
would prove to be a particularly potent competitor with thrift deposits. 
On the other hand, Brill, reporting on what he characterized as an "unsci- 
entific survey" of people investing in money market mutual funds, said 
that the responses suggested that these funds were largely alternatives to 
mutual funds in common stocks or direct investments in the stock market 
rather than to deposits in thrift institutions. 
The rationale and consequences of federal policy toward thrift institu- 
tions and homebuilding also entered into the discussion. Modigliani ex- 
pressed his concern about the unfairness of interest ceilings to the small 
saver who had less flexibility and higher transaction costs in finding alter- 
native assets. Michael Wachter felt that an interesting research project 
could be developed to assess the effects on income distribution stemming 
from the whole complex of government regulations in these areas, allowing 
for benefits to home buyers and mortgage borrowers as well as the adverse 
impacts on thrift depositors. 